A Game Theoretic Solution for the Optimal Selection of Software Components by de Lemos R & Merad S
A Game Theoretic Solution
for the Optimal Selection of Software
Components
Salah Merad and Rogério de Lemos
COMPUTING SCIENCE
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES
No. CS-TR-683
September, 1999
Contact: S Merad and R de Lemos
[Salah.Merad@newcastle.ac.uk, r.delemos@ukc.ac.uk]
http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/people/salah.merad/
Copyright © 1999 University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne,
Department of Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road,
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK
1A Game Theoretic Solution
for the Optimal Selection of Software Components
Salah Merad
Department of Computing Science
University of Newcastle
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK
salah.merad@newcastle.ac.uk
Rogério de Lemos
Computing Laboratory
University of Kent
Canterbury CT2 7NF, UK
r.delemos@ukc.ac.uk
Abstract. It is both difficult and expensive to design and implement a software system
that excels in all its functional and non-functional properties. Instead, we could envisage
a software system which is made up of several software components having
complementary attributes. These components are obtained from a library of software
components, each having a specific functional and non-functional profile, and they are
selected by a decision maker to satisfy the system requirements and optimise the quality
of service under cost constraints. This paper specifically considers the problem of the
optimal selection of software components with respect to their non-functional attributes,
and describes a game theoretic solution by formulating the problem as a bargaining
game. In addition to the game theoretic solution, the paper also discusses other
alternative approaches for the optimal selection of software components.
Keywords. Component-based software engineering, multi-attribute optimisation, game
theory, value trade-offs, non-functional requirements, utility functions.
1. Introduction
A general trend in the design of complex software systems is to employ off-the-shelf
software components aiming to achieve a degree of compositionality comparable with
the one already attained for hardware. Component-based software engineering is
regarded as an approach for developing large-scale software through component
selection, evaluation and assembly where the components are obtained from different
sources. Instead of building software systems that are complex in their nature, too costly
to design and maintain, and difficult to validate, software systems can be built from
simpler software components. Thus the wide range of services to be provided by such
2software system will depend on the complementary services provided by each of  its
individual components.
Software systems are normally characterised in terms of their functional and non-
functional properties. Although this distinction is controversial, in general terms, the
functional properties describe what the system does, while the non-functional properties
impose restrictions on how the system does it; the latter are usually expressed in terms of
some observable attributes, such as, dependability, usability and performance. During the
design process, depending on the service to be delivered by the system, the designer has
to select the components according with their functional capabilities. Once a set of
alternative components which satisfy the functional requirements is identified, the next
step is to optimally select components with respect to the non-functional requirements of
the system, and the non-functional attributes of the identified components. Most of the
work in component-based software engineering has focused on the functional aspects of
these systems rather than optimising a measure of the utility of their non-functional
aspects.
In this paper, a game theoretic approach is proposed for supporting the optimal selection
of software components during design-time. Given a user’s non-functional requirements,
we consider the problem of selecting a component, or a group of components, from a
library of several components, which have the same functionality, but differ in their non-
functional attributes (NF-attributes). In addition to the NF-attributes exemplified above,
which together specify the quality of service provided by a component, we also consider
the cost associated with the components. In the selection process, we seek to “optimise”
the quality of service provided by the software system, subject to cost constraints.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly motivate the game
theoretic solution for the selection of software components, in the context of alternative
solutions, such the Combined Utility Function introduced by Keeney (Keeney 1976), and
the Analytic Hierarchy Process which was used by Kontio (Kontio 1996) to solve a
similar problem. In section 3, we present a general model of a system of software
components, a solution in the form of a bargaining game, and a small case study to
exemplify the proposed approach. Section 4 presents other alternative methods, and the
3criteria for evaluating the various solution procedures. Finally, section 5 concludes with a
discussion evaluating our contribution and indicating directions for future work.
2. Motivation
One of the stages in the lifecycle of component-based software engineering is the
selection of components among several alternatives (Brown 1996). Once the functional
and non-functional attributes of these components are well characterised at their
interfaces (Franch 1998, Frolund 1998), the selection of the “best” component or group
of components becomes a multi-attribute decision problem. There exists already a large
literature outside the field of software engineering which deals with this type of problem,
see, for example, (Fishburn 1970, Keeney 1976) where the authors seek to represent the
decision maker’s preferences with a simple function. One of these approaches shows that
under some independence assumptions between the attributes, it is possible to represent
the user’s preferences and value trade-offs with a combined utility function
U x x xN( , ,...., )1 2  in terms of a simple expression. For example, under the assumption of
preference independence, the utility function has the following additive form
U x x x k u xN n n n
n
N
( , , ... , ) ( )1 2
1
=
=
∑ ,
where u xn n( ) , 1≤ ≤n N , is the utility function for attribute X n , and k k k N1 2, ,...,  are
scaling coefficients through which the user’s value trade-offs are evaluated empirically.
Hence, the combined utility function (CUF) requires assumptions about the
independence between attributes and the empirical evaluation of scaling coefficients. This
evaluation process is subjective and often yields inconsistencies, which are difficult to
eliminate even after repeating the process many times, especially when the number of
attributes is large. For a more detailed account of this method and its applicability for the
selection of components, see (Merad 1999).
In the context of software engineering, the complexity of component selection has
already been recognised, and a framework that supports multi-variable component
selection has been developed (Kontio 1996). In this framework two solution methods are
considered: the Weighted Scoring Method (WSM) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP). The latter was recommended because it is theoretically sound, it constructs the
4user’s utility function for each attribute, and it has a strong empirical validation. It is true
that the AHP is superior to the WSM, but it nevertheless has some shortcomings. The
AHP is a heuristic method, which yields an additive aggregate utility function, which has
the same form as the combined utility function under the assumption of preference
independence. In this aggregate utility function, the utilities for each attribute are
separately evaluated by pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives; they are in fact
positive numbers which add up to 1, and which represent ratio scale preferences between
the alternatives. But these utilities are not as accurate as the ones computed using the
method of von Neumann when representing the user’s strength of preferences and
attitude to risk (von Neumann 1947). Moreover, the inconsistencies in the pair-wise
comparisons may be difficult to eliminate when the number of components is large. Also
in this aggregate utility function the coefficients of the individual utilities are the weights
of the attributes, hence not incorporating the user’s value trade-offs between the
attributes.
For these reasons, we need to define another solution concept less prone to
inconsistencies, which is scaleable for a large number of components and attributes, and
which has an optimal solution in a well defined sense. Moreover, in addition to the above
features, we would like the method to be able to support the selection of components
during run-time, in order to adapt to changes that might occur in the operating
environment of the software system. In the case of CUF and AHP methods, all the
evaluations have to be carried out during design time for a specific set of requirements.
3. A Game Theoretic Solution
In the following, we propose a solution concept, which yields the selection of software
components which is the optimal in some well defined sense, without relying on the
decision maker’s (DM) subjective value trade-offs. For every attribute there is a certain
preference pattern over the available alternatives. If we try to optimise simultaneously all
the attributes, then the solution will be a compromise between the preference patterns of
all the attributes.
This solution is obtained when the DM delegates the decision process to self-interested
rational agents, each representing an attribute. The agent for attribute X n  has utility
5function u xn n( ) . The agents will then have to bargain with each other to reach an
agreement on which alternative should be selected. This solution will yield the alternative
that is as satisfactory as possible for each attribute. In this formulation, the DM’s value
trade-offs between the attributes are not incorporated into the structure of the game.
3.1 General Model of a System of Software Components
Let { }Α = A A AM1 2, , .... ,  be the set of components, which satisfy the user’s
requirements. Let X X X N1 2, ,....,  be N  NF-attributes that specify the quality of service
of a component. Let amn  be the value of attribute X n  in component Am , 1≤ ≤m M  and
1≤ ≤n N . Then, vector a m m m mNa a a= ( , ,..., )1 2  represents the profile of component
Am .
Let rvn  be a required value for attribute X n . For NF-attributes in which the higher the
value the better, the value of attribute X n  in a component must be equal to or greater
than rvn . We denote the user’s NF-requirements by the vector rv = ( , , ... , )rv rv rv N1 2 .
Let u m Mmn , ,...,= 1  be the utilities of attribute X n  of a component. The utilities are
computed using the method of von Neumann (von Neumann 1947, Keeney 1976), and
are scaled so as the utility is 0 at the required value and 1 at the best value (more details
on how to compute the utilities, see (Merad 1999)). The utility profile of component Am
is denoted by um m m mNu u u= ( , ,..., )1 2 .
Let ωn  represent the weight or importance of attribute X n . We have, 0 1≤ ≤ωn ,
n N= 1 2, ,.., , and ωn
n
N
=
=
∑ 1
1
.
Let cm  be the cost of component Am , and c
*
 the budget available for the software
system. Without loss of generality, we assume that c cm ≤
*
 for all 1≤ ≤m M .
Table 1 gives a summary of the components’ profiles and their weights together with the
user’s requirements.
6 Table 1.components’ profiles and user’s requirements
Attributes X1 X 2 … X N Cost
Weights ω1 ω2 ω N
         Required Values
Components
rv1 rv2 … rv N c
*
A1 a11 a12 … a N1  c1
A2 a21 a22 … a N2 c2
  .
  .
  .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
AM a M1 a M 2 … a MN cM
Given a user’s non-functional requirements (NF-requirements) and a limited budget, the
problem is to select the “best” component, or group of components, from a library of
components with respect to their NF-attributes and their cost.
3.2 The Nash Solution
Nash proposed a solution to the bargaining game in which, to avoid the prospect of not
reaching agreement, the players/agents are willing to submit their conflict to a “fair”
arbitrar (Nash 1950): an impartial outsider who will resolve the conflict by suggesting a
solution. The arbitration scheme devised by Nash is defined by a function, which
associates to each conflict a unique payoff to the players. The arbitration solution should
give each player at least as much as the player could get under the worst case, and there
should not be any other feasible payoff preferred by all players. In the context of
components selection, the worse case corresponds to the required value for an attribute
at which the utility is set at 0 for simplicity. For the mathematical formulation of the
subjective intuition of fairness, Nash defined a number of “fairness” axioms that can be
verbally expressed as follows (Luce 1957):
1. The arbitration solution should not depend upon the particular utility units used by the
players.
2. The arbitration scheme should be egalitarian in the sense that it is independent of the
names or labels attached to the players.
73. The solution must be robust, i.e. slight perturbations or errors of measurements
should not alter drastically the arbitrated solution.
Before we describe the method to find the Nash solution, we will define some terms:
1. A randomised strategy δ  is an M -tuple ( , ,..., )δ δ δ1 2 M , where 0 1≤ ≤δm ,
m M= 1 2, ,...,  and δm
m
M
=
∑ =
1
1 . δm  is the probability of selecting component Am .
2. The expected utility for attribute X n  under the randomised strategy δ  is given by
EU u an m
m
M
m mn( ) ( )δ δ=
=
∑
1
.
3.  A strategy δ  is dominated if there exists a strategy β  such that EU EUn n( ) ( )δ β≤ ,
for all { }n N∈ 1 2, ,...,  and at least one inequality is strict.
4.  A strategy δ  is said to be Pareto optimal if it is not dominated.
5.  Let ∆  be the set of randomised strategies that are Pareto optimal and such that the
expected utility (payoff) for every attribute is positive. Then the set of Pareto-optimal
payoffs ( )V ∆  is defined as
( ) { }V v v v v v EUN n n∆ ∆= = = ∈( , ,...., ) ( ),1 2 δ δ .
6.  Let vn , 1≤ ≤n N , be the expected utility for attribute X n  under strategy δ . Then
the (generalised) Nash product (Binmore 1992), which gives a measure of the quality
of service, is defined as
F v v v vN n
n
N
n( , ,..., )1 2
1
=
=
∏ ω .
The Nash solution is achieved by maximising the Nash product in the set of Pareto-
optimal payoffs. The Nash product not only satisfies the above four “fairness” axioms, it
can be shown that it is the only function which does so (Nash 1950). Hence, these
fairness conditions implicitly define a unique arbitration scheme for bargaining games.
In terms of the problem of selecting a component, or a group of components, from a
library, the set of Pareto-optimal payoffs is a portion of the boundary of the convex hull
8generated by the utility profiles of the alternative components. This convex hull, which
we denote by H M({ , ,..., })u u u1 2 , can then be represented as a convex combination of
these profiles (Bazaraa 1993), that is
( )H v v v u n NM N n m mn m m
m
M
m
M
{ ,... , } ( , ..., }: , ,u u v1 1
11
1 0 1= = = ≤ ≤ ≥ =
== ∑∑δ δ δ and .
In the context of our problem, this means that the optimal solution will be the
combination of at most N  components from the pool. Figure 1 illustrates an example
with a library of five components and two attributes. The extreme points of the polytope
represent four of the components, and the internal point represents the fifth component.
The set of Pareto-optimal payoffs is drawn in bold.
To find the Nash solution, we need to maximise the Nash product in the set of Pareto-
optimal payoffs. This is achieved by maximising the Nash product over the region
defined by the convex hull H M({ , ,..., })u u u1 2 ; that is, by solving the non-linear
constrained optimisation problem
P1 : max ( , ,..., )imise F v v v vN n
n
N
n
1 2
1
=
=
∏ ω
                    subject to:
                        ( )v u u u∈H M{ , , ... }1 2 .
Fig.1. Set of Pareto-optimal payoffs
0
1
1
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9If we substitute vn  by δm mn
m
N
u
=
∑
1
 in the expression of F v v vN( , ,..., )1 2 , problem P1  is
then equivalent to problem
P2 : max ( , ,..., ) lnimise G uM n m mn
m
M
n
N
δ δ δ ω δ1 2
11
=




==
∑∑
                                subject to:
                                               
δ
δ
m
m
M
m m M
=
≥ ≤ ≤
=
∑ 1
0 1
1
,
, .for  
Problem P2  is a non-linear optimisation problem with one linear equality constraint and
M  linear inequality constraints. There are numerous approximate numerical methods to
solve problem P2  (Bazaraa 1993), for instance, the Zoutendijk method (Zoutendijk
1960), the successive linear programming approach (Griffith 1961) and the generalised
reduced gradient method (Abadie 1969). The latter method is the basis of the solver used
in numerous software packages such as LINGO (Schrage 1991) and GRG2 (Lasdon
1978).
Let ( )δ δ δ δ* * * *, ,...,= 1 2 M  be the optimal solution of problem P2 . All the software
components for which there is a positive probability of being selected will compose the
optimal group. As was noted above, there will be up to N  components in the optimal
group. The total cost Cδ *  of the group, which corresponds to the Nash solution δm
*
, is
given by
C cm m
m
M
δ θ* ,=
=
∑
1
where
θ
δ
δm
m
m
=

>
=
1
0
0
0
if  
 if   
*
*
.
The budget available for expenditure on the system is c* , and if the total cost Cδ *  does
not exceed c* , we say that the solution δ *  is admissible. To avoid having non admissible
solutions, we could express the budget requirement as a constraint which we add to the
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optimisation problem P2 . Unfortunately, we can only approximate this constraint by the
nonlinear inequality
δ
δ ε
m m
mm
M c
c
−
≤
=
∑
1
*
,
where ε  is a small positive number, and the resulting solution turns out to be very
sensitive to the choice of ε . Moreover, when there are nonlinear constraints, the
standard algorithms do not guarantee convergence to the optimal solution. We hence
adopt an iterative process to find a feasible solution.
When the optimal solution is non-admissible, components of the optimal group have to
be removed from the pool, and the new Nash solution for the reduced pool has to be
found. A tree diagram can represent this removal process: the nodes are the pools
together with their optimal solutions. The root node is the original library and its
solution, and every node has a number of offspring equal to the number of components in
the optimal group associated with a non-admissible solution; that is, up to N  offspring.
If a node yields either an admissible solution or a non-admissible solution, whose Nash
product is lower than the highest Nash product of the existing admissible solutions, then
the removal process is discontinued on this node. On the other hand, if the Nash product
is higher than the one of all the admissible solutions, then the removal process continues.
At the end of the removal process, if there is more than one reduced pool for which the
Nash solution is admissible, then the DM will choose the solution with the highest Nash
product. But the optimal admissible solution may be only marginally better than some of
the other solutions, whereas its cost may be much higher. In this case, the DM may
prefer to trade-off the Nash product of the groups against their total costs. For instance,
suppose that there are K  reduced pools whose solutions are δ δ δ( ) ( ) ( ), ,...1 2 K , with Nash
products F F F K( ) ( ) ( ), ,...1 2 , respectively. For each solution, we define the value trade-off
index T k( )  by
T
F
C
k
k
k
( )
( )
( )
=
δ
,
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and the solution with the highest index is chosen. But this exhaustive search may require
iterating the removal of components up to M − 1 times. In the worst case scenario, at
iteration k , 1 1≤ ≤ −k M , there are N k −1  pools, and hence a total of 
1
1
1
−
−
−N
N
M
 pools
are examined, which is very large. But if c*  is large enough, say comparable to Nc ,
where c  is the average cost of the components in the pool, then the search is very likely
to terminate quickly.
When c*  is much smaller than Nc , it is more efficient to consider all the groups of size
equal to or smaller than N  and whose total cost does not exceed c* , find the Nash
solution for every group, and select the group with the highest Nash product or trade-off
index.
3.3 Example
In the following example, the aim is to optimally select a component, or group of
components from a pool of four software components which are characterised by the
three attributes:
1.  X 1  represents the reliability of a component, and it is given by the probability of
operating without a fault during a given length of time under a given set of operating
conditions;
2.  X 2  represents performance, and it is measured in the number of operations executed
per unit time;
3.  X 3  represents the availability of the system, and it is given by the probability that the
system is functioning correctly at any given time.
Table 2 gives the profiles of the four components, together with the user’s weights and
required values.
12
Table 2. Data for the example
Attributes X1 X 2 X 3 Cost(£)
Weights 0.5 0.25 0.25
         Required Values
Components
0.95 100 0.90 500
A1 0.97 130 0.92 100
A2 0.99 110 0.96 170
A3 0.98 120 0.93 160
A4 0.96 140 0.94 150
Assuming linear utility functions for all attributes, and setting utilities at 0 at the required
values, and at 1 at the maximum values, the utilities are given by
u
a rv
a rvmn
mn n
n n
=
−
−
*
,
for ,41 ≤≤ m  1 3≤ ≤n , where a an
m
mn
* max=
≤ ≤1 4
. The computed utilities are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3. Utility profiles of the components
         Attributes
Components
X1 X 2 X 3
A1 0.5 0.75 1/3
A2 1 0.25 1
A3 0.75 0.5 0.5
A4 0.25 1 2/3
Using the package LINGO (Schrage 1991), we find that the optimal solution is to select
the group { }A A2 4, , where components A2  and A4  are selected with probabilities 0.84
and 0.16, respectively. Its Nash product is 0.72 and its total cost is 320. This solution is
hence admissible. Its trade-off index is 0 72320 0 002. .= .
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If the available budget c* = 270 , then the above solution is not admissible because the
total cost of the group is 320. We need to remove one of the components composing the
group.
1. Component A2  is removed from the pool. The optimal solution in the resulting
reduced pool is to select component A3  only. The Nash product is equal to 0.61 and
its cost is 160. This solution is hence admissible. Its trade-off index is 0 61160 0 004. .= .
2. Component A4  is removed from the pool. The optimal solution in the resulting
reduced pool is to select the group { }A A1 2, , and the components are selected with
probabilities 0.07 and 0.93, respectively. The Nash product of this solution is 0.71 and
its total cost is 260. This solution is hence admissible. Its trade-off index is
0 71
260 0 003. .= .
Both solutions are admissible, but group { }A A1 2,  has the higher Nash product, whereas
{ }A3  has the higher trade-off index.
Note that when the available budget is c* = 500 , the optimal group { }A A2 4,  is
admissible, but it has a lower trade-off index than the groups { }A3  and
{ }A A1 2, obtained if the removal process was carried out on the original pool. The Nash
product of group { }A A2 4,  is only slightly higher than that of group { }A A1 2, , but the
total cost of the latter is significantly lower. However, the search procedure cannot
prevent such situations as, once an admissible solution is found at a node, the search is
terminated at that node.
4. Alternative Methods and Evaluation Criteria
In the methods considered so far, there is a need to construct utility functions, make
assumptions, and perform computations. These tasks can be inaccurate, tedious, and time
consuming. However, depending on the problem, simpler methods can be adopted for
the selection of components. For instance, if one of the attributes is clearly much more
important than the others, than we can make the selection with respect to only that
attribute. However, in most cases there is a need for methods that are able to handle the
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selection of components based on more than one attribute. The first part of this section
introduces two alternative  methods, and the second part discusses criteria that can be
used for evaluating the methods considered in this paper.
4.1 Alternative Methods
The two alternative methods we present below are computationally simpler, at the cost
of disregarding the information about the DM’s strength of preferences. The solutions
obtained using these methods are all Pareto-optimal. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that for all the attributes that characterise a component the high values are the
most desirable.
• Minimum Weighted Sum of Ranks (MWSR)
 In this method, components are ranked from the best to the worst for every attribute,
with the best having rank 1, and the worst rank M .
 Let rmn , with 1≤ ≤r Mmn , be the rank of component Am  with respect to attribute
X n . Taking into account all attributes and their importance, the overall rank of
component Am  be given by its weighted sum of ranks defined as
 R rm n mn
n
N
=
=
∑ω
1
.
 The optimal component is the one with the lowest overall rank.
 This measure has the same form as the aggregate utility function of the AHP method,
but with ordinal individual utility functions. The optimal component is obviously the
one with the minimum weighted sum of ranks.
• Maximum Weighted Product (MWP)
In this method, an index is evaluated for every component, and the component with
the highest index is selected. The index I m  of component Am  is defined as
I a a am m m mNN= 1 21 2
ω ω ω
... .
This index is a measure of utility first introduced by Bridgeman (Bridgeman 1922) and
later used by Miller and Star (Miller 1960) for goal programming problems. But the
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rationale behind this solution, the implicit assumptions, and how the solution is related
to the decision maker’s preference structure were not well understood (Johnsen
1978). This index has in fact the same form as the Nash product when restricted to
non-randomised strategies, with the individual utilities being identical to the values
taken by the components for the attributes. The individual utility functions are linear
and represent ratio scale preferences, however, they are not of the von Neumann type.
This method is hence not suitable if the decision maker’s attitude to risk is not neutral,
because this gives rise to a nonlinear utility function.
4.2 Evaluation of Methods
In the previous sections, a number of solution concepts were presented for selecting
components from a library. The solution concept that should be adopted depends on the
decision maker’s interests, the information he/she can provide, the practicality of the
computation, and most importantly, the trade-offs between the computational effort and
the gain in utility over simpler but “cruder” methods. Below, the methods presented will
be evaluated qualitatively with respect to the information required, the type of solution
obtained, and the computational effort involved.
4.2.1 Information
To be able to help a DM make a rational choice between the available alternatives, we
need to know the profile of every component for the various attributes, the individual
utility functions, and how he/she may trade-off between the attributes.
• Profiles: In all the methods, the components need to be measured with respect to
every attribute in some chosen scale. In the MWSR method, the components need
only to be ranked from the worst to the best for each attribute, so the precision in the
measurement is less important than in the other methods so long as the difference
between the components is obvious.
• Individual Utility Functions: All the methods use individual utility functions, but the
functions used can be different and some may contain more information than others
about the DM’s preference patterns. For instance, in the combined utility and the
Nash solution, the utility functions are constructed using the method of von Neumann,
whereas in the AHP and the MWP they represent ratio scale preferences. In the
16
MWSR method, the utility functions are ordinal and hence they contain the least
information about the DM’s strength of preferences.
• Value Trade-offs: Only the combined utility method incorporates the DM’s value
trade-offs explicitly through the scaling constants evaluated in indifference
experiments that can only be carried out off-line. As noted above, the method of
evaluation of the constants is subjective and can lead to inconsistencies that can be
difficult to eliminate completely. Other methods such as the MWSR, the MWP and
the Nash solution use the importance coefficients as partial measures of the value
trade-offs. A simpler method that bases the component selection on the most crucial
attribute, obviously, does not incorporate any measure of value trade-offs.
4.2.2 Type of Solution
All the methods suggested yield Pareto-optimal solutions. This is a minimal requirement
for any method. The combined utility function represents the DM’s true preference
structure when some independence assumptions between the attributes hold. The AHP
and the MWSR methods yield an aggregate utility which approximates the true
preferences of the DM, but it is not clear what assumptions are implicit and how good is
the approximation. The Nash solution yields a solution which optimises simultaneously
all the attributes taking into account their importance and the DM’s strength of
preferences for every attribute. The MWP yields a solution of the same type as the Nash
solution, but without including the DM’s true structure of preferences for the attributes.
The game theoretic solution can yield randomised strategies, and hence to the selection
of more than one component. This leads to higher costs, but also to a solution that is
robust to small changes in the components’ profiles or the utilities
4.2.3 Computational Effort
The amount of computation needed varies greatly between the methods. In the Nash
solution, the main computational effort is the optimisation of a separable function over
the boundary of a convex hull for which efficient methods exist. In the combined utility,
the main computation is to solve a system of linear equations, as part of the evaluation
process of the scaling coefficients. The other methods require very simple arithmetic and
sorting operations.
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5. Conclusions
As the discipline of component-based software engineering (CBSE) gains momentum as
a means to build large and complex systems from components originated from different
sources, new methods have to be devised to efficiently build these systems. Within the
context of CBSE lifecycle, the activity of selecting components has not yet received its
due attention, if compared with the other activities that define this lifecycle (Brown
1996). In this paper, we have described a game theoretic approach for the optimal
selection of components from a pool of software components, which can be viewed as a
library of components dispersed on the Internet. It is assumed that the components of
this pool are functionally identical, but have different, perhaps complementary, non-
functional properties. Also it is assumed, when composing components, that the non-
functional properties of the individual components are not affected. The problem that we
undertake to solve is the optimal selection of software components with respect to their
non-functional attributes and their associated costs, and the non-functional requirements
of the system to be built and its allocated budget.
Although the scenario of component selection that we considered might appear
unrealistic in today’s context of the commerce of software components, it is nevertheless
plausible in the near future if the current practices of software development change. This
will increase the availability of a wide range of software components, thus making it
possible for software houses to start commercialising their products. However, before
we are able to exercise in practice the optimal selection of software components from the
perspective of their non-functional attributes, there is the foremost need of providing the
required support for the composition of software components from the functional
perspective.
As future work, study is being conducted to identify simpler and more efficient
approaches targeted for systems that have to be easily reconfigured during run-time to
adapt to changes that occur in their evolving environment. The optimal selection of
components should be done without any human intervention, and within the context of
plug-and-play architectures (Lowry 1998).
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Another issue which needs attention is how to evaluate the integration cost of a group of
components to be used together. This cost has to be estimated in advance, and some
experience may be needed to reduce the uncertainty in the estimation.
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